I.          Introduction

            In the last 20-40 years, various scientifically-based movements have gained numerous adherents.  What I mean by such movements are those to eliminate global warming, efforts to promote conservation, save endangered species and in general to respect mother earth, Gaia. 

            I want to talk about a presupposition that such movements tend to share, namely the principle that the earth is good and worthy of respect.

II.         Scientific versus Non-scientific Principles.

            Philosophers of science have long analyzed several philosophical presuppositions of scientific methodology, that is, those principles that cannot be established by science, but are presupposed in its method.  The most famous example is Hume’s problem of induction and its presuppositions of the uniformity of nature.  Any inductive argument attempting to prove such uniformity would necessarily presuppose that same uniformity and thereby beg the question. 

            I do not wish to examine this issue.  Rather, I want to focus on what we presuppose when we say things like “We should leave the earth a better place”  “We should work together to reduce coal emissions” or “We need to protect the sea turtles, or any other species of plant or animal.”  In other words, I want to address the notion that the earth/nature is valuable. 

            Scientific methodology seeks to explain, predict, and, sometimes, control, material, physical phenomena.  This methodology remains silent on issues of value, goodness, etc.  A person might say that scientific methodology is the only legitimate means to obtaining knowledge, but this claim does not commit one to saying science can meaningfully talk about value, only that value claims would, in principle, be rationally unjustifiable.

            However, I would guess that most adherents to the popular scientific movements mentioned above do hold the earth is good or worthy of some respect.  So, some other means of rational justification is being presupposed, which is good because it is most likely philosophy.  Philosophy tries to make sense of human experience, and uses rational reflection and logical analysis on that experience as key tools in its investigations.  I want to approach the issue from a philosophical perspective.

III.        Possible Answers to the Question “Why should I care?”

            I want to structure the remainder of this talk around this scenario.  Imagine that you tell someone that they should conserve, support programs to reduce the causes of global warming, or some such environmental issue.  They tell you that they do not care about such things.  Or perhaps, they show some willingness to dialogue by asking why they should care, or why does it matter.  What responses could be given to such a questions?

            To reiterate what I said above, our response must be, strictly speaking, non-scientific.  By this I mean the response cannot be reducible to something established via strict scientific methodology.  Again, science can point to physical facts, but it cannot say why we should care.

            Response #1.  We could respond to our unconcerned friend by saying that they should care.  By this, we probably mean that it is obvious that such issues are important.  Now, such a response is obviously unacceptable in that it does not seem to satisfy even the minimal standards of rationality.  Chances are, our friend does not care because he does not see that the earth is valuable.  We have not provided any evidence in favor of our position.

            Response #2.  We could say that we need to preserve the earth for the sake of our children and future generations.  This, perhaps, is the most common response.  However, we need to recognize that this response is not really directed towards the independent value of the earth.  Rather, it merely says the earth is valuable only insofar as it serves human interests, whether those interests are current or projected future interests.  In other words, with this response, the earth or more particular some species of plant or animal are only instrumentally valuable relative to human desires.  In sum, the response is not primarily earth-directly, but rather human-directed.

            We can discuss this point more during the second part of today’s session.  I am guessing that most proponents of popular scientific movements believe that the earth and nature’s value is not reducible to raw human interests.  For instance, efforts to save the sea turtles or whales are not solely, if at all, motivated by concern for future human beings to observe and enjoy the turtles and whales.  Rather, there is a belief that there is something good or valuable about these species, and that these species should be protected and preserved irrespective of future human interests.

            If I am right that the earth is presupposed to be good and worthy of respect independent of human desires and interests, then it is important that the adherent of this position be able to rationally defend this claim.  The alternative would be to hold that it is rationally permissible to not have reasons for one’s beliefs.  That would be an odd option to take for someone who is otherwise strongly attracted to the scientific mindset of proportioning beliefs and theories to the available evidence. 

IV.       Theories of Value

            Let us take a look at our philosophical options with respect to the notion of value or goodness.  I should point out that even if one has reasons for thinking things can have some sort of intrinsic value independent of human interests, one would still have to argue why the earth is one such thing.  However, for our purposes, we will grant the point and focus on the nature of value.

            I would say that there are two relevant approaches to understanding the nature of value.

            1.  Value not derived from human interests:  Things are valuable to reasons not reducible to human desires, such that a considered valuable object would retain its importance or value, even in the absence of human beings.

            2.  Value derived from human interests:  Value is neither a property in a thing nor reducible to a property in a thing.  Rather to say that something is valuable is reducible to saying that someone desires or prefers a thing.  Value is in the eye of the beholder, if you will.

            The crux of the issue is whether we think that the earth or the sea turtles are worth saving, even if no human benefits.  If we take option 2, then the answer to the question must be no.  In other words, in explaining why we think the earth and its various species are important, our response boils down to maintaining that humans have a vested interest in it, and nothing more.  In other words, we cannot make the claim that the earth/nature is valuable in and of itself, irrespective of human interests, whatever they might be. 

            However, if one wishes to claim that even if no human ever sees or benefits from, say the sea turtle or the giant squid in the depths of the ocean, that these things still should be persevered, then such a person is opting for option 1.  To repeat, if such a person wants to be consistent with her belief commitments concerning earth’s human-independent value, then she must affirm that there can be a type of value that is not reducible to human desires and interests   

            But how do could one establish that claim?  Well, again, if we restrict ourselves to purely scientific methodology we cannot.  There are various philosophical accounts to attempt to explain non-human dependent value, but there are no conclusive or non-controversial accounts out there.  Most such theories appeal to one of two possible defenses.

            1.  If we are do justice to human experience, we need to admit that there are objects possessing intrinsic value.  The contours of the experience are such that the object would have been important or valuable, even if humans never existed.  One needs to do some work to construct this account in such a way to avoid our response #1, which was “things just are valuable; it’s obvious.”

            2.  The other approach is to argue that our world is the product or creation of God.  God infuses goodness or value into creation. 

            This approach could stay within the confines of philosophy or it could be adapted to a religious approach.  Given the nature of this forum, I want to conclude by discussing this latter option.  We could argue that the earth is good and worthy of respect on religious grounds.  The big three monotheistic religions all in some way affirm the book of Genesis, which affirms jus this point:  God created the world and saw that it was good. 

            Anytime one offers such a suggestion, the natural question from the point  of view of rational acceptability is “Why should I accept such information as divinely revealed?”  Obviously we cannot go into these issues other than to say that if we want to make a case for the legitimacy of popular scientific movements, when we are quite aware that they rest upon non-scientific presuppositions, then we might as well take advantage of the religious approach.  If our interlocutor is religious, then we are one step closer to answering his question as to why he should care.