The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
A Failure of Implementation
Thomas Ambrosio
University of Virginia
Paper presented at the Columbia University Graduate Student Conference on "State and Nation Building in East Central Europe, Contemporary Perspectives" -- Columbia University, 1-2 March 1996
Abstract
After nearly one full year of brutal fighting throughout central Bosnia-Herzegovina, representatives of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed an agreement in early March 1994 transforming the internal structure of the territories held by their respective armies. By utilizing the city of Mostar as a test-case, this essay shows that the Federation largely remains a fiction. It is argued that the lack of implementation of this quasi-state is due to the failure of substantive military integration and the position of the Croats. Without any progress on those two fronts, the attempt to rebuild some semblance of a multiethnic Bosnia through the Federation project will most likely fail.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Historical Background
Case Study: Mostar
Military Integration and the Croat Position
Conclusion
Postscript
Endnotes
I. Introduction
In a mixed Muslim-Croat village in central Bosnia-Herzegovina west of Sarajevo near the town of Kiseljak, anthropologist Tone Bringa filmed a documentary which showed how relations in the country were affected by the civil war. [1] In early 1993 she captured the feelings of Izreta, a Muslim villager, on interethnic relations:
Izreta: All [of us] have lived together. Even now relations between neighbors are good...Muslims and Croats.
Bringa: And you are visiting [your neighbors]?
Izreta: It's the same as before as far as neighbors are concerned. We must get along together. No sane person would commit atrocities here, because we have to live here. Together.
Bringa: This is how you've always lived?
Izreta: Always! That's the way it is. Such is Bosnia. We have to live together: Croats, Serbs, Muslims. That's how Bosnia is. Bosnia can never be any other way.
Over the next several weeks, scattered clashes between Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia became more widespread, organized, and systematic. Consequently, relations within the village deteriorated. In Kiseljak and surrounding areas, the better organized Croats began to assert control over whatever territory they could. In Izreta's village, both Muslims and Croats began to reaffirm their confessional identity. Increasingly, each side perceived the other in ethnic terms and as potential enemies.
Relations within the village continued to decay, as Izreta's remarks illustrate: "Listen! We had expected it from the Chetniks [Serbs]. But not from our Croat neighbors. This is why I feel offended." Slavka, a fellow villager and Croat, summarized the changes that have occurred in both the village and her own feelings regarding interethnic relations: "Suddenly people can change their face. With me the change happened in a day. You can't describe it."
Bringa returned to the village eight weeks later. In the interim, an attack on the village by the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) led to five days of interethnic violence in which the Croats emerged victorious. All Muslim homes were destroyed or severely damaged while Croat homes were left intact and hardly touched. After the fighting -- which left Izreta and her family without a home -- Izreta had the following response to Bringa's question regarding whether or not she could conceive of herself ever living amongst her former Croatian neighbors: "Now? Impossible! We can't live with them anymore. How can I live with them when they destroyed all I had? There can be no more living together!"
The events in Izreta's village were only a small part of the Muslim-Croat war that engulfed central Bosnia. Fueled by the dreams of a 'Greater Croatia' and significantly supported by Franjo Tudjman's regime in Zagreb, the HVO won some impressive victories early in the conflict. The nature of the so-called 'second Bosnian war' was just as fierce as that between the Muslims and Serbs. In some cases, even more so. Thousands were killed and many more thousands were driven from their homes. In many areas of central Bosnia victims of ethnic cleansing who had previously escaped the Serbs were displaced again as fighting swept through their new refuges. Both sides committed appalling atrocities against the civilian population of the other. It appeared as if the multiethnic community of Bosnia-Herzegovina had finally perished. Little less than one year after open warfare erupted between the two parties, however, representatives of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats -- under intense pressure from the United States -- signed an agreement concluding peace between the two peoples and transforming the internal structure of the territories held by their respective armies. [2] More than a year and a half later, the Federation is far from being a reality.
The importance of studying the Federation is quite obvious due to its pivotal role in any future peace in the region. Without some sort of Muslim-Croat union, Bosnia will most likely be divided into three ethnically homogeneous entities with the Bosnian Muslims controlling an economically inviable, landlocked state surrounded by hostile forces. Furthermore, the Dayton Agreement -- signed on 21 November 1995 -- requires the Federation to function as one-half of a reconstructed Bosnia. At a higher level of analysis, the Federation may prove to be a precedent-setting set of institutions which will have further application in other ethnically torn states. Whether or not a similar institutional framework should be applied in those areas will likely depend on the relative success or failure of this agreement. If the problems faced here are insurmountable, then it is likely that support for partitioning ethnically divided societies will rise as hope for preserving multiethnic states decreases. Thus, the process of statebuilding in Bosnia has important implications for many ethnically segmented states.
The focus on the Federation instead of the Dayton Agreement -- one-half of Bosnia rather than the whole -- is justified on two grounds: one practical, the other pragmatic. First, the Dayton Agreement is so recent that any progress on its implementation will be negligible at this time. On the other hand, the Federation was existed for nearly two years and therefore some preliminary conclusions can be reached on the progress made thus far. Even if the institutions included in the Dayton Agreement are established sometime in the future, the Federation itself is supposed to function as one half of the revamped Republic. Given that the new Republic will largely be a fiction under the Dayton Agreement, it is proper to study the Federation itself on its own terms. The second reason is more fundamental in addition to being pragmatic. Simply stated, if the Bosnian Muslims and Croats are unable to consolidate their respective territories into some sort of a meaningful political entity, then the prospects of a rebuilding Bosnia as a state in which Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats can live together is nil. The obvious assumption being that the difficulties between the Muslims and Croats are equal to or less than those between Serbs and Muslims. This assumption is sound. Despite the indisputable brutality of the Muslim-Croat war, the perception of the Bosnian Serbs as both the primary aggressor and human rights abuser in the conflict -- in addition to the obvious logic behind an anti-Serb Muslim-Croat alliance -- easily leads one to the believe that the Croat-Muslim problems are more easily overcome. As Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Republic's Presidency, argued before a meeting of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in late March 1994: "We have reached the conclusion that one front has to be extinguished, and that it would be better and less painful if it were done with the Croats. True, our wounds are still fresh from the conflict with them, but they are nonetheless lighter than the ones inflicted on us by the Serbs." [3] As he further explains, unlike the Serb-Muslim war, the Croat-Muslim conflict did not have the support of a large portion of the Croatian people, the Catholic Church or the Croatian intelligentsia. If one also considers the outside pressure that the Western powers have placed upon the Croats (in both Bosnia and Croatia) and the Muslims in order to make this agreement work, then the chances for a Muslim-Croat rapprochement are likely to be much higher than between Muslims and Serbs.
This essay will be divided into four further sections. First, a very brief history of the Muslim-Croat conflict and reconciliation will be rendered. Second, we will utilize the city of Mostar as a test-case to illustrate the progress made thus far on the Federation project. Third, two explanations will be provided to explain why the Federation has not been fully implemented: the lack of integration between the HVO and the BiH Army and Croat intransigence. Lastly, this essay will conclude by pointing to how the West can play a vital role in fostering both greater cooperation between Muslims and Croats and progress on the Federation project.
II. Historical Background
The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has its roots in the Serbo-Croatian debate over the nature of Yugoslavia as a union of south Slavs. The inability and unwillingness of the two sides to reconcile their positions led to the dissolution of the Yugoslav League of Communists when the Slovene delegates, followed by the Croats, walked out of the party's Congress in January 1990. Throughout the rest of the year, all six Yugoslav republics held multiparty elections. Varying only by degree, nationalist or national-based parties emerged victorious in all republics. Bosnia was no exception. But given its tripartite ethnic composition, the December 1990 elections were won by the three national parties, each capturing approximately 85% of the vote from their respective ethnic group and 89% of the total. [4]
Although the three national parties agreed to rule as a coalition, they had very different visions of Bosnia's future. The [Muslim] Party of Democratic Action (SDA) wanted the republic to emerge independent if Croatia and Slovenia left Yugoslavia. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) refused to remain in any form of Bosnia that was not connected either federally or confederally to Serbia. Although the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ-BiH) was internally divided between a pro-Bosnian faction led by Stjepan Kljuic and a pro-Croatian (read secessionist) faction led by Mate Boban, both factions supported an independent Bosnia either as an end in itself or as a means to an end, respectively. [5]
Attempts to reach some sort of a compromise stalemated in late summer 1991 as fighting erupted in Slovenia and Croatia. On 14 October 1991, SDA and HDZ-BiH members of the Bosnian Assembly passed a resolution -- over the objections of Serb delegates -- calling for the republic's sovereignty. Bosnian Serbs acted quickly to create their own separate institutions -- which would eventually become the Srpska Republic -- and held a referendum on 9-10 November which endorsed the SDP's position on the future of Serbs in the republic. Parallel to the Serbian actions, the Boban faction of the HDZ-BiH established both the Croatian Community of Bosnian Sava Valley in central Bosnia on 12 November 1991 and the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna -- which included thirty municipalities in both western Herzegovina and the Posavina region of northeast Bosnia -- on 18 November 1991. [6] However, these 'Croatian Communities' did not formally secede from Bosnia at this time.
In mid-December 1991, the members of the European Community (now European Union) put forth its criteria for recognition to the republics of the quickly collapsing Yugoslavia. Pursuant to the criteria and additional provisions included in the Badinter Committee report, Bosnia held a referendum on 29 February and 1 March 1992 -- with the Bosnian Serbs largely boycotting -- and voted overwhelmingly for independence. Immediately afterwards, fighting erupted between Bosnian Serbs on one hand and Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and pro-Bosnian Serbs on the other.
Between December 1991 and the referendum, the Boban faction of the HDZ-BiH was able to assume control of the organization by forcing Kljuic to resign as president of the party because, in the words of Mate Boban, he was "too much Bosnian, too little Croat." [7] Although the HDZ-BiH and the SDA cooperated in the referendum despite their two very different intentions, this collaboration quickly turned to suspicion. On 6 May 1993, Boban met with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in Graz, Austria to discuss the division of Bosnia. [8] Less than a week later, Bosnian security forces engaged Croatian soldiers over abandoned Yugoslavian National Army facilities. Despite signing a formal alliance with the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid-July 1992, the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnian Croats continued to pursue their goal of creating a Greater Croatia at the expense of the Republic.
During the summer of 1992, Croat military units began to ethnically cleanse Muslims in western Herzegovina. By October 1992, the ostensible military alliance between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims effectively ended when Croats abandoned Bosanski Brod on the Sava River to Serbian forces and left the Muslim population to fend for itself. This led to sporadic fighting between Muslim and Croat forces in central Bosnia which lasted throughout the fall of 1992 and the winter of 1993, "leading to a series of bloody but short-lived clashes that were resolved with cease-fires and renewed pledges of mutual support." [9] The introduction of the Vance-Owen plan in January 1993 -- which called for the division of Bosnia into ten provinces nominally controlled by a weak central government -- sent Muslim and Croat forces scrambling to consolidate control over territories assigned to them in the plan. Muslim-Croat relations quickly deteriorated. Sustained fighting began in mid-April throughout central Bosnia. Accounts of atrocities surfaced early: rapes, summary executions, mass arrests, and forced population transfers were reported. [10]
Fighting continued throughout 1993 with occasional lulls. Initial Croat victories were erased over time by Muslim forces (BiH Army). The BiH Army's extremely successful 'Christmas Offensive' precipitated a threat by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to intervene directly in the war: "Either the Moslems renounce this policy or the world will have to understand the measures we will be forced to take to defend the Croat people there." [11] In late January 1994, Croatia made good on its threats and dispatched several thousand soldiers into central Bosnia via western Herzegovina. [12] This action brought immediate western and United Nations Security Council condemnation. [13] When its historic supporters, such as Germany, Austria, and Hungary, began to turn their proverbial backs on them at this time, it became clear to the leadership in Zagreb that their country was becoming a global pariah. [14] Tudjman was forced to make a strategic choice between his two aspirations: on the one hand, he wanted to create a 'Greater Croatia' by annexing parts of Bosnia; on the other, he wished to have his state integrated into Western security, political, and economic institutions. Reluctantly and under tremendous pressure from the United States, Tudjman chose the latter. He forced Boban's resignation and agreed on behalf of his country and the Bosnian Croats to enter into peace talks. With this 'turn' in Croatia's Bosnian policy, events moved rapidly.
A series of meetings in Geneva, Bonn, and elsewhere involved negotiations on "all models of future Muslim-Croatian relations" in Bosnia. [15] A tentative plan was agreed to on 21 February. Two days later, a comprehensive ceasefire was signed. Despite a number of violations, the Framework Agreement creating a federation within Bosnia and the Preliminary Agreement establishing a confederation between Bosnia and Croatia were signed on 1 March 1994 in Washington, DC by Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, and Boban's replacement as leader of the HDZ-BiH and president of Herceg-Bosnia Kresimir Zubak. The details of the Federation Constitution were worked-out and it was ready for signing on 18 March. On 30 March, the Bosnian Assembly unanimously approved the Constitution and it took effect that day at midnight.
The Federation Constitution provided a timeline for its implementation to be completed by mid-November 1994. These deadlines were not met. Because of disputes between the SDA and the HDZ-BiH, a number of subsequent agreements were drafted. Most of these agreements went unheeded too. It was not until the signing of the Bonn Agreement (aka Petersburg Agreement) on 9 March 1995 that substantive progress began. [16] Although the Bonn Agreement's deadlines were formally extended in mid-May 1995, it appears that both sides had finally made a commitment to make the Federation a reality. [17] The significance of the Federation was reaffirmed on 8 September 1995 when the first face-to-face negotiations in more than a year between the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and the rump-Yugoslavia took place in Geneva. The agreement reached in principle called for the Republic to exist as the legal international entity with its internal institutions divided between the Federation and the Srpska Republic. The peace plan initialed in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995 codified this earlier agreement. [18]
III. Case Study: Mostar
As cities, Sarajevo and Mostar are akin to Berlin. What connects all three is how their internal partition was or is symbolic of a division between two parties of a conflict. Berlin was the embodiment of the Cold War -- the words of Presidents Kennedy and Reagan before the Berlin Wall made this clear. Sarajevo -- the epitome of the multiculturalism in Bosnia -- remains divided between Muslims and Serbs and represents the division between them. Similarly, the divided city of Mostar embodies the divisions between Muslims and Croats within the Federation.
The HVO launched a massive attack upon BiH Army positions in Mostar on 9 May 1993. This offensive was generally hailed as a success: except for a small enclave on the west bank of the Neretva River, all BiH Army forces were routed into east Mostar and completely surrounded by the HVO. The destruction of Mostar's Old Bridge -- a physical symbol of the area's interethnic accommodation -- by Croat artillery solidified the division of the city on 9 November 1993. Afterward, Bosnian Croat forces shelled east Mostar mercilessly during its nine-month siege; it is estimated that over one-hundred thousand Croat shells fell on east Mostar. [19] Estimates of the number of Muslims living within east Mostar -- a strip of land along the Neretva 5km long and 2km wide -- range between 57,000 and 75,000. [20] One report maintained that with the exception of Srebrenica, east Mostar was the worst place in Bosnia. [21] West Mostar -- the part controlled by the HVO -- was just the opposite.
On 5 July 1994, Zubak (who was elected Federation president in late May 1994) and Izetbegovic signed the Mostar Agreement in Geneva which placed the city under European Union administration for a period of no more than two years. The agreement outlines the EU's role in the city which includes: (a)restoring Mostar to the status of "a single, self-sustaining and multi-ethnic" city; (b)contributing to "the holding of democratic elections" which are to take place before the EU's mandate expires; (c)restoring public utilities and general reconstruction; (d)returning displaced persons to their homes; and (e)establishing "a single police force, unified at all levels." [22] The prerequisite to reintegrating the socio-political-economic life of Mostar, however, is widely recognized as being the establishment of free movement of persons throughout the city. Unfortunately, the HVO has only allowed very limited movement from east to west: "...movement between the two parts of the city is restricted to two-hour visits for 50 residents a day who cross a damaged bridge to meet in a tent and for 100 other who are bused back and forth for visits ending at 6 p.m" with only children and the elderly allowed to visit. [23] This number had risen first to 200 per day and then to 250 in 1995. [24] Whatever access is permitted is subject to bureaucratic delays, cumbersome formalities, and the whims of HVO leaders and checkpoint officers. In February 1995, an EU-organized Muslim-Croat chess match had to be canceled when Croatian police would not allow 20 Muslims players from the east to travel to the west. One diplomat working for the EU administration was reported to complain: "The Croats saw the chess game as part of some insidious plan to force a slow unification of the city....If it is overambitious to organize a chess game, what can we do?" [25] While the story of the chess match is an excellent anecdote, a much more serious episode occurred in early March 1995 which caused the EU administrator to threaten to pull the EU out of Mostar: HVO officials refused "to recognize the validity of EU identity cards issued to Moslem doctors to allow them to cross over from the eastern part of town" even though they were scheduled to visit the site of a large hospital in the west in which the EU had planned to invest approximately $20 million. [26] To this date, the policy of the HVO has not changed.
Even if freedom of movement were to be restored immediately, the inability of the EU to establish a joint police force would make such freedom useless given the continuance of both harassment and expulsions of Muslims in the west. Just prior to the signing of the Mostar Agreement, over eighty Muslims were either "evicted" or "fled because of fear of harassment." [27] After the signing of the Mostar Agreement, the flow of expelled Muslim slowed but did not stop. The continued expulsions are the result of the inability or, more likely, unwillingness of the HVO leadership to force the groups under its command or within its jurisdiction to cease their mistreatment of Muslims. The reluctance of Croat police to investigate crimes if the victim is a Muslim is a serious impediment to the safe return of refugees. In fact, according to the senior UNHCR coordinator for Mostar, only six Muslims have been returned to their homes by February 1995 -- a number that has not changed much since then. [28] As throughout the rest of the Federation, the repatriation of families has been painstakingly slow. [29]
The attitude of Bosnian Muslim and Croat officials on the issue of establishing a unified police force is as divided as the city itself: the Muslims want the police immediately unified while the Croats want to keep their own administration in their areas. Little to no progress has been made on this problem despite the efforts of a multinational police force from the West European Union. The Bosnian Croat police have refused WEU supervision of their work on the grounds that it would infringe upon the rights of Herceg-Bosna as a 'state'. Although the question of a joint police force was supposed to have been resolved through arbitration by 26 March 1995, the Croats have made it clear that they are not willing to surrender control over west Mostar or its police force. Direct talks between the SDA and the HDZ-BiH under the auspices of the EU administrator are considered to be a positive sign. [30] Beginning in mid-June, international arbiters have mediated discussions between Federation executives on this and other local issues. [31] Another agreement signed in Dayton on 10 November 1995 regarding Mostar also offers some promise, though resistance from local leaders may ruin it. [32]
In summation, Mostar stands largely the way it did on 9 May 1993: divided between areas exclusively controlled by the Bosnian Croats on one hand and by the Muslims on the other. Although some integration and progress has occurred elsewhere in the Federation, the pattern thus far in mixed areas has been continued separation. Without real progress being made on the ground, the institutional structures of the Federation will remain a fiction. Despite the serious commitment of the EU and the United States to the Federation project, we can not say with any credibility that the Federation exists. In order to answer the inevitable question "Why?," we must turn to the lack of military integration between the two armies and the stance of the Croatians.
IV. Military Integration and the Croat Position
Currently, the territory of the Federation is de facto divided into two entities exclusively controlled by two separate military structures answerable to two separate de facto states: the Republic and Herceg-Bosna. The example of Mostar illustrates how it is impossible to reconstruct a multiethnic community when it is divided between two militaries. As long as this situation continues, the Federation will not be able to fully function for three reasons. First, the continued deployment of the two separate militaries will always allow for a recourse to force by one side or the other. Such a state of affairs is not conducive to a peaceful and orderly consolidation of power by the center. Second, the division of the Federation's means of coercion suggests that its mandate and laws can only be implemented at the pleasure of the military of one side or the other. Rather than having equal enforcement throughout the Federation, some cantons may ignore Federation legislation at will as long as the local military supports the policies of the cantonal authorities. Third, the separate areas of control will continue to be an impediment to the safe return of displaced persons and the enforcement of human rights in controlled territories; individuals who are not of the same national group as the dominating military force in the area may be at risk if they are even allowed to return to their towns and villages. Additionally, individuals will understandably be reluctant to return to their homes if that means that they will have to return to an area occupied by the very same army that was either directly or indirectly responsible for the initial displacement. If refugees can not return to their homes and the two ethnic groups remain divided both in terms of ethnicity and political and military institutions, then the Federation will be more akin to a confederation between two de facto countries rather than a unified state.
Although the Federation could order those forces which are loyal to it to enforce its mandate, the use of an army in such a manner would presumably precipitate a general clash of the two armies and replay the events of April 1993-February 1994. Given that this is not an optimal outcome, the only possible recourse the Federation leadership would have is to order the Judicial Police -- established under Article IV.C.8(1) of the Federation Constitution -- to intervene on the local level. The problem with this is clearly explained by Robert M. Hayden and appropriately quoted at length:
The Judicial Police are then likely to confront the cantonal police, a clash that the Judicial Police would lose, unless an army could back them up -- but there is no army! This is hardly a purely hypothetical scenario. Even in as well structured a federation as the United States, [US] Presidents...had to use federal troops to overpower local police in the southern states in the 1950s and early 1960s. [33]
Without a unified military, the Federation can not be said to effectively control the territory that it claims to rule. Without effective control, the process of statebuilding will fail.
Progress on military integration has proceeded symbolically but not substantively. The ceasefire agreed to on 23 February 1994 and put into effect on 7 March has generally held with only scattered and isolated violations. The Split Agreement signed 12 March 1994 committed both sides to the principle of a joint armed forces for the Federation. Unfortunately, however, this agreement sanctioned the transitional existence of two separate armies and failed to establish a timetable for the creation of a joint command. Another agreement -- signed on 26 March in Sarajevo -- added substance to the Split Agreement by defining "the organization and tasks of the joint commands in the interim period." [34] These joint commands were to become operational immediately after the ratification of the Federation Constitution, but disagreements over the relative autonomy of the two armies obstructed its implementation. On 15 May 1994, the headquarters for the joint command officially opened in Sarajevo. This site was moved to central Bosnia in early February 1995 in order to improve cooperation on the ground and to provide it with symbolic and substantive independence from the Republic's military structure. In early July 1994, the Joint General Staff pledged itself to begin formulating a body of rules and regulations which would allow it to give orders to forces in the field. [35]
The work of the nascent Joint General Staff has been frustrated by the lack of a Federation defense bill which was supposed to "provide for the basis on which the federal [armed forces] will be established, [including] the purposes of the army, to whom it should be responsible, and from whom it should get funds." [36] In mid-December 1994, the defense bill should have been approved by the Federation constituent assembly but was not. A subsequent deadline of 15 April 1995 set by the Bonn Agreement was extended to late June. This deadline, too, was not met. Despite a number of agreements and two years of meetings, declarations, and military cooperation against the Bosnian Serbs, the joint command structure exists only on paper and the two armies -- and more importantly, the Croatian and Muslim people -- remain separate.
In addition to the lack of military integration, the second serious problem has been the failure of many Croats to relinquish their dreams of building a Greater Croatia. [37] It is critical to note, however, that one can not fully separate the strategic interests of the Bosnian Croats from those of the Republic of Croatia. For the most part, the interests of the Bosnian Croats have been subordinated to Croatia's as the events of February 1994 -- specifically the ease with which Boban was removed -- and thereafter have shown. Tudjman's control over the HDZ-BiH is much stronger than Miloševic's control over the Bosnian Serbs ever was. This is not to say that Tudjman can simply order the Bosnian Croat leadership to do his bidding. The HDZ-BiH continues to retain some degree of autonomy from Zagreb. However, it is clearly the case that Tudjman's control over the HDZ-BiH is sufficient to pressure the Bosnian Croats to make certain strategic choices. In other words, even if Tudjman can not generate specific outcomes in specific circumstances, he is certainly able to set the Bosnian Croats' broader agenda. Thus, the focus must be on Zagreb.
As stated above, Tudjman is and continues to be torn between the two projects of establishing a Greater Croatia and integration with the West. Croatian military victories in Krajina and southwest Bosnia run the risk of Croatian greed potentially dismantling the Federation. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times quoted a United Nations as follows: "There is considerable arrogance on the Croat side because of their successes...[and] they think they are on a roll and can dictate and dominate in their relations with the [Muslims]." The report continues: "...Croatia has gained a clear upper hand in the regional balance of power, fueling fears that Tudjman may try to assemble a 'Greater Croatia' including Croat-controlled territory in Bosnia.... The Croatian and Bosnian Croat armies...have claimed their newly won territory for themselves, even if the land traditionally belonged to their Muslim allies." [38] Croatian parliamentary elections of late October 1995 have also raised the specter of continued Croatian irredentism: Bosnian Croats were allowed to vote in the election and send representatives to the parliament in Zagreb despite the objections of Republic and Western leaders. [39] Hence, in addition to having a fully functioning government (Herceg-Bosna) and a de facto union with Croatia-proper -- for example, the Bosnian Croats use the Croatian kuna as their currency, fly the Croatian flag, and even have license plates on their cars and signposts on their roads issued from Croatia itself -- the Bosnian Croats voted in the Croatian parliamentary elections and Herceg-Bosna officials were seated in the Croatian parliament. [40] This state of affairs is obviously not conducive to the Federation project.
It is clear that Tudjman wants to square the circle by achieving both of his goals. At the same time, however, Western Europe and the United States has generally made it clear that support for the Federation is a prerequisite to any Croatian 'Return to Europe' and therefore Tudjman's overt rhetoric seems to support this line. Nevertheless, the Bosnian Croats, at Tudjman's behest, have been able to obstruct the Federation project in Mostar and elsewhere without going far enough to call into question Croatia's relationship with the West. [41] The general position of short term obstruction of the Federation project resonates with many Bosnian Croats. As long as the Bosnian Croats are obligated to live with the Muslims in the same state -- that is, as long as the West will not allow the creation of a Greater Croatia -- it is considered imperative that the Federation effectively replace the Republic. For the Croats, the status quo ante bellum Republic is wholly unacceptable for two reasons. First, it does not contain any substantive institutional expression of the Croats as a constituent nation. Second and more importantly, the Republic is founded upon majoritarian principles. The dissimilarity in population between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats would allow the former to dominate the latter in a one-person, one-vote democracy. The institutional guarantees found in the Federation Constitution make it the only acceptable political arrangement for the Croats.
In order to fully protect themselves from Muslim domination -- either real or perceived -- most Croats believe that it is necessary to maintain separate governing institutions and areas of control until the Republic is dissolved (or simply emasculated) and the Federation is made irreversible. In other words, until a rejection of majoritarianism can be sufficiently secured through the Federation, it is necessary to safeguard the Bosnian Croats through separate institutions. Certainly there is a degree of duplicity involved in this position: what is ours is equally ours regardless of our respective numbers, but what is mine is mine only. Nevertheless, the HDZ-BiH has taken a number of policy positions with the support of Zagreb that fit consistently within this paradigm. It is also important to remember that the Bosnian Croats consider both the Republic and Herceg-Bosna as national institutions and equivalent in regard to their respective legitimacy. As long as the Muslims maintain the BiH Army and the Republic, then it is necessary for the Croats to maintain the HVO and Herceg-Bosna. Thus, from the Croatian side, military and political integration can only proceed as far as the Republic fades. And even then, the process will be a slow one with the Federation's ultimate success or failure still remaining uncertain.
V. Conclusion
After a brief chronology of the events leading up to the formal establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this paper has shown that the Federation itself is merely a fiction. Utilizing the city of Mostar as a test case, it can be clearly seen that the territory held by the Muslims and Croats remains divided between two political entities and their respective militaries. Given this state of affairs, the process of statebuilding within the Federation can not proceed and will ultimately fail. This essay provided two explanations for why the implementation of the Federation Constitution has been stalled: the lack of military integration and Croatian intransigence. With these conclusions noted, we must look at how positive change may be generated within the Federation.
It is easy to say that the HVO and BiH Army must be incorporated into an all-Federation armed forces so that the process of statebuilding can carry on. How one gets there is a far more difficult problem. Although neither side is blameless regarding this problem, the Croats have been more reluctant to relinquish exclusive operational control over the HVO. [42] Even though the use of the threat of islamic fundamentalism has been unforgivably overexaggerated for propaganda purposes, the increasing islamization of the BiH Army is a real and serious issue. [43] The recent promises made by the Muslim leadership to oust foreign islamic volunteers from Bosnia may help the cause of military integration. However, the fear of Muslim domination over the Croats -- whether real or imagined -- will necessarily make the Bosnian Croat leadership loath to relinquish operational control over its military in the near future.
However, no matter what the Bosnian Muslims do, it will be the cost/benefit calculations made in Zagreb that will ultimately determine whether or not the Federation will become a reality. A consenting Croatia serves as the permissive and necessary variable upon which all else rests since it is the Bosnian Croats that have been the major impediment to the implementation of the Federation. It is at the critical juncture between Tudjman's two goals that the West can play a decisive role and engender a strategic choice by Zagreb that is beneficial to the Federation. As long as the western leaders can both make it clear that a failure to build the Federation will call into question Croatia's chances of being integrated into the West and provide Croatia with tangible benefits that come as a direct result of a 'Return to Europe', then Tudjman will have little other choice then to provide the political will to the HDZ-BiH (or to force it, depending on the situation) to accommodate and compromise on the vital issues facing the Federation such as military integration, the return of refugees, and the reunification of Mostar and other areas. Without this pressure from the West and a positive response from Zagreb, the Federation is in peril. If the West allows Tudjman to have his proverbial cake and eat it too, then the Federation's statebuilding process is inexorably doomed.
VI. Postscript
Since this essay was completed, a number of events have occurred that have important implications for the Federation. On the negative side, scattered fighting between the HVO and the BiH Army in Usora and Mostar reenforces what has been said above regarding the dangers of separate militaries and also illustrates the continued divisions within the Federation between Muslims and Croats. [44] On the positive side, pressure has been increased on the Croats to allow the Federation to be implemented. It was reported that during US President Clinton's visit to Croatia in January 1996, Clinton "read Tudjman the riot act" about Bosnian Croat intransigence in Mostar and Bosnia generally. [45] This appears to have had some impact since a little over a week later, it was reported that the HDZ-BiH "agreed to transfer its executive functions to the federation" and that Herceg-Bosna would "become a political organization and give up its governmental role." [46] If the HDZ-BiH actually followed through on this most recent promise, there might be some serious possibility for optimism in regard to the Federation's future. In addition, the formation of the first postwar Federation government headed by Prime Minister Izudin Kapetanovic illustrates the continued importance of the Federation as the linchpin of peace in the region. [47]
Any optimism however, must be tempered by the events on the ground: Muslim-Croat repatriation efforts continue to be painstakingly slow, Mostar endures as a divided city, and both the BiH Army and the HVO remain active. While there is some room for confidence that the Federation will (eventually) become a reality, the lessons learned from the implementation of the Federation thus far must make any overly positive predictions circumspect.
VII. Endnotes
In addition to the citations provided below, this essay used a number of other sources as background information.
For possibly the best overview of the events leading up to the war from the perspective of Yugoslavia as a whole, see: Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin Books, 2nd edition, 1993).
Two Bosnia-specific sources include: Allen Lynch and Reneo Lukic, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals (Great Britain: Oxford University Press); and Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
For two additional and very helpful sources, see: Helsinki Watch, Abuses by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in Central and Southwestern Bosnia-Hercegovina (New York: Helsinki Watch, September 1993); and Patrick Moore, "The Croatian-Muslim Agreements," RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 13 (1 April 1994): 20-4.
Since this essay is an adapted version of the author's Master's Thesis, please see the citations and bibliography from that work for a complete listing of all sources utilized: Thomas Ambrosio, "The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina," (University of Virginia: Master's Thesis, May 1996).